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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
  This action for declaratory and injunctive relief is 
brought pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 4321.  Maiden Creek Associates and the Board of 
Supervisors of Maidencreek Township appeal the order of the 
District Court dismissing their complaint and denying their 
motion to amend.  We will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Maiden Creek Associates (“MCA”), a limited 
partnership, owns 85 acres of land in Maidencreek Township 
that it hopes to develop into a 600,000 square-foot shopping 
center.  The Board of Supervisors of Maidencreek Township 
(the “Board”) has taken the public position that the shopping 
center is “vital” to the economic well-being of the Township 
residents.  (Compl., at ¶43.)  MCA and the Board claim, 
however, that the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation’s (“PADOT” or “PennDOT”) plan to improve 
an adjacent highway, State Route 222, will impede what they 
hope to accomplish.  
 
PADOT’s Project would involve the following:  (1) 
widening the highway from one traffic lane in each direction 
to a five-lane cross section with two lanes in each direction 
and a center turn lane; (2) improving the existing traffic 
signal at Route 222 and Route 72; (3) replacing an existing 
traffic signal at the intersection of Route 222 and Tamarack 
Boulevard/Genesis Drive with a dual lane roundabout; (4) 
constructing a new, dual lane roundabout at the unsignaled 
intersection of Route 222 and Schaeffer Road; and (5) 
constructing two storm water detention basins on MCA’s 
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property.  The Project would be undertaken by PADOT on 
behalf of the United States Department of Transportation and 
the Federal Highway Administration, and fully funded by the 
federal government.    
 
MCA opposed the Project from the outset, but its basis 
for doing so has changed over time.  Initially, it maintained 
that the Project should not go forward because the traffic 
circles would not be able to handle all of the traffic expected 
to be generated by its shopping center.  MCA expressed its 
concerns to PADOT directly in a string of correspondence, 
and was heard publicly on July 17, 2014 before the Reading 
Area Transportation Study (“RATS”).  RATS characterized 
MCA’s concern as regarding “[d]esign issues with [the] 
proposed roundabout” and “its ability to accommodate a 
proposed shopping center.”  (Compl., at ¶52.)  In response, 
RATS offered that “[u]tilizing current PennDOT roundabout 
analysis software, PennDOT is projecting acceptable future 
levels of service for all legs of [Route] 222 and Genesis 
Drive, and [Route] 222 and Schaeffer Road intersections and 
feel[s] that their design will not preclude the ability to 
develop.”  (Id.)   
 
The Project was approved on August 6, 2014, at which 
time PADOT also made a critical finding regarding the 
degree of environmental review mandated by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).  NEPA requires that 
one of three levels of review be conducted for such projects, 
depending on, among other things, the extent of the 
environmental impact: (1) actions that significantly affect the 
environment require an Environmental Impact Statement; (2) 
actions for which the significance of the environmental 
impact is unclear require an Environmental Assessment; and 
(3) actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a 
significant environmental effect are entitled to a Categorical 
Exclusion from preparing an Environmental Impact 
Statement or Environmental Assessment.  23 C.F.R. § 
771.115.   Finding that the Project satisfied the criteria for the 
Categorical Exclusion set out in 23 C.F.R. § 771.117(d), 
PADOT necessarily concluded that neither an Environmental 
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Assessment nor an Environmental Impact Statement were 
required under the Act.   
 
MCA and the Board commenced this action in 
response, naming as defendants the United States Department 
of Transportation; its Secretary, Anthony Foxx; the Federal 
Highway Administration; its Administrator, Gregory G. 
Nadeau (“Federal Appellees”); and PADOT and its Secretary, 
Barry J. Schoch (“State Appellees”).  MCA and the Board 
alleged in their joint complaint that the Categorical Exclusion 
approval was based on inaccurate information supplied by 
PADOT that had not been adequately studied or investigated, 
and that the findings and conclusions contained therein were 
arbitrary and capricious.  They argued that, in submitting and 
approving the Categorical Exclusion, “PADOT (i) failed to 
consider important aspects of the environmental issues 
associated with the Project; (ii) ignored material information 
supplied by MCA; and (iii) disseminated completely 
inaccurate information that is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.” (MCA Br. at 5.)  These procedural “defects” 
notwithstanding, the defendants’ response was that the crux 
of the issue, as initially pled, concerned only the economic 
impact of the planned highway improvement; that, “[a]side 
from some general allegations about increased traffic and the 
safety of motorists, all of the injuries alleged by MCA and the 
Board … were purely economic—neither alleged that the 
project would harm the environment.”  (Federal Appellees Br. 
at 5-6.)   
 
Defendants moved to dismiss on precisely the same 
basis.  In their motion filed May 11, 2015, they argued that 
NEPA is meant to protect the environment and that MCA and 
the Board could not sustain claims thereunder because their 
“sole[ly]” economic pursuits fell outside of NEPA’s “zone of 
interests.”  (A266-270).  MCA and the Board opposed the 
motion, and also moved for leave to amend their complaint.  
On August 20, 2015, the District Court granted the motion to 
dismiss.  The Court concluded that MCA and the Board’s 
interests were economic and inconsistent with NEPA’s goal 
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of protecting the environment, and that, therefore, they lacked 
prudential standing to pursue their claims under the statute.  
The Court also denied their motion for leave to amend as 
futile, finding that the new allegations inappropriately rested 
on injuries to third parties and were otherwise too speculative 
or generalized to support a claim.  
  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, as the claims in this case were brought under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
First, we exercise plenary review over the dismissal of 
a complaint for failure to state a claim,1 “accept[ing] all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw[ing] all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving parties.” 
Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 918, 921 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2015). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard is satisfied only if 
                                                   
1  Although appellees moved to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and the District Court 
appeared to dismiss the complaint under that rule, we must 
analyze its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because the issue is 
whether appellants alleged harm that falls within NEPA’s 
zone of interests, a question of statutory standing. See Leyse 
v. Bank of Am. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Unlike Article III standing, statutory standing is not 
jurisdictional. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 & n.4 (2014). As a result, 
‘[a] dismissal for lack of statutory standing is effectively the 
same as a dismissal for failure to state a claim,’ and a motion 
to dismiss on this ground is brought pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), rather than Rule 12(b)(1).” (citation omitted)).   
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the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.” Id.   
 
Second, although we review a denial of leave to amend 
for abuse of discretion, we review the District Court’s 
determination that the amendment would be futile de novo.  
U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 
837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).  To evaluate futility, we apply the 
“same standard of legal sufficiency” as would be applied to a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Shane v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). As with the motion to dismiss, 
we consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public 
record.  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
Because NEPA does not include a citizen’s suit 
provision, MCA and the Board commenced this action by 
way of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), Section 
702.  5 U.S.C. § 702.  Parties bringing suit under that 
provision must establish their Article III standing2 and 
demonstrate that their grievance falls within the “zone of 
interests” to be protected or regulated by the statute in 
question.  See Assoc. of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).  The latter requirement 
forms the center of our inquiry.  Appellees submit that the 
purpose of NEPA is to ensure that environmental concerns 
are integrated into their decision making process, and argue 
that the “injuries” alleged in both the complaint and the 
proposed amended complaint fall outside the “zone of 
                                                   
2  The District Court found that both MCA and the Board 
established Article III standing in light of MCA’s allegation 
that the Project will require condemnation of part of its 
property and the Board’s allegation that the Project will 
prevent it from carrying out its economic plans for the 
Township.  (A15-16.)   
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interests” advanced by the Act. 
 
NEPA is a procedural statute that was enacted to 
“declare a national policy which will encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; [] 
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and 
welfare of man; [and] enrich the understanding of the 
ecological systems and natural resources important to the 
nation.”  42 U.S.C. § 4321.  It seeks to protect and promote 
environmental quality, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)-(c), and, to 
“ensure this protection, [NEPA] establishes ‘action forcing’ 
procedures the agencies must follow.”  Comm. to Save the 
Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1996).  
NEPA does not “mandate the particular decisions an agency 
must reach”; rather, it sets forth the “necessary process the 
agency must follow while reaching its decisions.”  Id. 
 
The Act does not, however, require an agency to assess 
every impact of a proposed action—only its impact or effect 
on the physical environment.  Metro. Edison Co. v. People 
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983).  While 
the statute makes reference to human health and welfare, the 
Supreme Court has explained that those considerations do not 
form the statute’s primary focus.  Rather, those “goals are 
ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means of 
protecting the physical environment.”  Id. at 773 (emphasis in 
original).  Courts have thus found that organizations with 
genuine environmental interests are proper parties to 
represent the public’s environmental interests and challenge 
agency action.  Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 
F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2005).  Conversely, courts have found 
that parties motivated solely by their own economic self-
interest should not be entrusted with the responsibility of 
asserting the public’s environmental interest.  Id.   
 
1. The Initial Complaint 
 
Appellees argue to us, as they successfully argued to 
the District Court, that the initial complaint alleged only non-
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environmental harm—that the Project would not properly 
accommodate the traffic attendant to MCA’s proposed 
shopping center, and that the Township’s tax base will be 
negatively impacted thereby.   
 
MCA alleged that (1) “PADOT’s construction of the 
Schaeffer Roundabout would require vehicles to access the 
Proposed Shopping Center directly from the Schaeffer 
Roundabout, which would result in unsafe traffic conditions” 
(Compl., at ¶36); and (2) the “proposed Schaeffer 
Roundabout cannot be designed in a manner that would safely 
accommodate the amount of traffic that will be generated by 
the Proposed Shopping Center,” (¶37), and “would also 
require the condemnation of a portion of the Property in order 
for PADOT to physically construct the proposed Schaeffer 
Roundabout.” (¶38.)  The Board alleged similar injuries: the 
“construction of the Genesis Roundabout and the Schaeffer 
Roundabout” will “severely impede commercial development 
of the Route 222 Corridor in the Township,” “impair the 
ongoing viability of existing businesses within the Route 222 
Corridor by restricting and impeding ingress and egress to 
those businesses,” and “compromise the safety of motorists, 
bicycles, horse and buggies and pedestrians traveling within 
the Route 222 Corridor.”  (Compl., at ¶¶45-47.)  The Board 
also emphasized that development is “vital” to the economic 
well-being of the Township, and implied that any obstacle 
thereto would negatively affect jobs, tax revenues, and local 
businesses.  (Id. at ¶43.) 
 
To show that these injuries fell within NEPA’s zone of 
interests, MCA and the Board relied primarily on this Court’s 
decision in Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assoc. v. Rendell, 
210 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2000).  Plaintiffs in that action were 
neighborhood residents who claimed that the City of 
Philadelphia had not properly analyzed the environmental 
consequences of its plan to build a hotel and parking garage 
in the Penn’s Landing area of the City and failed to hold the 
meaningful public hearings that should be held when there is 
a substantial environmental controversy.  Id. at 173-74 (citing 
40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(c)(1)).  The residents claimed that the 
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project would “increase traffic, pollution, and noise in the 
Society Hill area where they live” and also argued that the 
project would “have a detrimental effect on the ambiance of 
their historic neighborhood, [] impair their use and enjoyment 
of Penn’s Landing, and [] decrease their property values.”  Id. 
at 176.  Noting that if the residents did not have standing to 
protect the historic and environmental quality of their 
neighborhood, it was hard to imagine who would have 
standing to oppose the action, we held that these grievances 
were consistent with NEPA’s zone of interests.   
 
Here, however, MCA and the Board presented a very 
different set of purported injuries, and we find the analogy to 
Society Hill unpersuasive.  In the initial complaint, MCA and 
the Board submitted only that the Project will compromise 
commercial development and result in unsafe traffic 
conditions along the highway.  Arguing that they have the 
right to sue on that basis, MCA and the Board emphasize 
their belief that NEPA was intended to “ensure” that “man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony while fulfilling 
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and 
future generations of Americans.”  (Board Br. at 21-22.)  As 
the Supreme Court already has made clear, however, NEPA’s 
reference to human health and welfare does not displace the 
statute’s primary focus.  Indeed, the Court has explicitly 
cautioned against such an expansive approach:  “If we were 
to seize the word ‘environmental’ out of its context and give 
it the broadest possible definition, the words ‘adverse 
environmental effects’ might embrace virtually any 
consequence of a governmental action that someone thought 
‘adverse.’ But we think the context of the statute shows that 
Congress was talking about the physical environment -- the 
world around us, so to speak.”  Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. 
at 772.   
 
No doubt, changes in traffic patterns and increased 
congestion will have an impact on safety, commercial 
viability, and growth of the area.  But to suggest that such 
injuries fall within NEPA’s zone of interests would be to 
eviscerate the distinction between social and environmental 
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harm—one expressly preserved by the Supreme Court in 
Metro. Edison. Co. and in the regulatory definition of 
NEPA’s “human environment.”  40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 
(“[E]conomic or social effects are not intended by themselves 
to require preparation of an environmental impact 
statement.”).  NEPA may capture those interests in certain 
circumstances, but only where they are sufficiently linked to 
imminent or threatened environmental damage.  MCA and the 
Board failed to allege any “threatened harms to the ‘physical’ 
environment – ‘the air, land and water which support life on 
earth,’” and their complaint was rightly dismissed on that 
basis.  Hurd Urban Dev., L.C. v. FHA, 33 F.Supp.2d 570, 576 
(S.D. Tex. 1998) (quoting Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 770).   
 
2. The Proposed Amended Complaint 
 
MCA and the Board made more detailed allegations in 
the proposed amended complaint, some of which came closer 
to NEPA’s zone of interests.3  MCA alleged, much like 
before, that the Project will create “unsafe traffic patterns” for 
MCA’s patrons, (Proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC”), at 
¶40(A)-(C)), and be “aesthetically unpleasant and 
                                                   
3  The State Appellees argue that the request for leave to 
amend should also be denied as unduly delayed because the 
information underlying MCA and the Board’s new allegations 
was available to them prior to their filing of the initial 
complaint.  While it is difficult to believe that MCA and the 
Board were not aware of these purported environmental 
injuries until after commencement of this environmental 
litigation, the argument nonetheless lacks merit.  MCA 
credibly responds in its reply brief that after the initial 
complaint was filed, it came to possess a number of 
documents grounding its amended complaint, including 
“engineered highway plans which showed PADOT’s 
intentions to divert stormwater runoff from the highway 
improvements to two (2) stormwater detention basis to be 
located on MCA’s Property to [filtrate] that runoff into the 
groundwater beneath the MCA Property.”  (MCA Reply Br. 
at 5.)  We will address that allegation, infra. 
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intimidating to potential patrons,” (¶40(E)), but also added 
allegations that it will increase “exhaust fumes from 
vehicles,” (¶40(D)), create “additional stormwater runoff that 
would contain petroleum and other potential groundwater 
contaminants,” (¶40(F)), may cause “flooding on the MCA 
Property,” (¶40(G)), and damage “Peters Creek, which is 
identified as an [Exceptional Value Watershed].”  (¶40(H).)  
The Board alleged that the Project would increase “pollution 
within the Route 222 Corridor,” (PAC, at ¶41(A)), expose 
“Township residents” to “unsafe traffic patterns,” (¶41(B)), 
be “asesthetically unpleasant,” (¶41(C)), cause “groundwater 
contamination” and “flooding on Route 222 and private 
properties adjacent” thereto, (¶41(E)-(F)), and “increase the 
risk” of “potentially devastating cumulative environmental 
effects.”  (¶41(G).)  For the following reasons, we agree with 
the District Court that these new allegations were nonetheless 
insufficient.   
 
a. Third Party Injuries 
 
Unlike the residents in Society Hill, MCA and the 
Board allege certain environmental harm not to plaintiffs in 
the case (who they do not argue will be directly affected 
thereby), but to future employees and patrons of MCA, or to 
the Township residents of Maidencreek.  From MCA, the 
proposed amended complaint’s paragraph 40 subsection (e) 
complained that the Project would be “aesthetically 
unpleasant and intimidating to potential patrons, and would 
dissuade potential patrons from coming to the Proposed 
Shopping Center.”  (PAC, at ¶40(E).)  And from the Board, 
subsection (b) claimed that the Project “will result in unsafe 
traffic patterns and conflicting movements by motor vehicles, 
bicyclists and pedestrians throughout the Route 222 Corridor 
within the Township, thereby unreasonably exposing 
Township residents and visitors to risk of injury.”  (PAC, 
¶41(B).)   These allegations will be disregarded for the same 
reason—they purport to assert the injuries of non-parties 
without satisfying the criteria for associational standing.   
 
Certainly, an association may sue on behalf of its 
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members “when [such] members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are 
germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.”  See Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000); see 
also United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. 
Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555 (1996) (the association 
must “include at least one member with standing to present, 
in his or her own right, the claim (or the type of claim) 
pleaded by the association”).   
 
But MCA is a “Pennsylvania limited partnership which 
owns approximately 85 acres of commercially-zoned land … 
in Maidencreek Township … upon which it proposes to 
develop a commercial shopping center.”  (PAC, at ¶11.)  And 
while it may be permitted to assert claims on behalf of its 
partners (if satisfactorily pled), MCA may not represent the 
interests of “potential patrons” of its future shopping center.  
The Fourth Circuit dealt with a similar issue in Taubman 
Realty Group Ltd. P’ship v. Mineta, 320 F.3d 475 (4th Cir. 
2003).  In that case, the plaintiff, Taubman Realty Group 
(“TRG”), owned and operated a shopping center and asserted 
claims under NEPA to prevent the construction of another 
shopping center nearby.   TRG alleged that construction 
would create undue traffic congestion, but the Fourth Circuit 
adopted the district court’s reasoning and found that TRG 
failed to demonstrate its ability to represent such interests 
through associational standing:  “TRG claims to be asserting 
the safety and health interests of, and seeking to prevent 
perceived harm to, persons who are employed, and who shop, 
at the shopping center that TRG operates. Because the 
interests at stake in this case are not at all ‘germane’ to TRG's 
organizational purposes, however, it does not properly have 
standing to sue in an associational or representative capacity.”  
Taubman, 198 F. Supp. 2d 744, 758 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d 
320 F.3d at 481; see also Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal 
Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. USDA, 415 F.3d 1078, 
1104 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting cattlemen’s associations 
attempt to assert the environmental interest of members 
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because they were not “germane to the organization’s 
purpose”). 
 
The same applies to the Board’s allegations, to the 
extent they are predicated on interests of the Township and its 
residents.  Simply stated, the Board is not the Township.  The 
Board of Supervisors of Maidencreek Township is “the 
governing body of Maidencreek Township [], a second class 
township of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,” (PAC, at 
¶12), and the Township of Maidencreek, a non-party here, has 
authority to “sue and be sued” on its own behalf.  (53 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 66501.)  The Board did not 
allege that its members—i.e., the Supervisors themselves—
have suffered environmental injuries, nor has it explained 
how it has the authority to represent the Township or its 
citizens in this action.  Indeed, even if the Board were 
permitted to sue on behalf of Township residents as parens 
patriae, its claims likely would be barred because 
departments of the federal government are named as 
defendants.  See e.g., City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 
261, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Although ‘the state, under some 
circumstances, may sue [as parens patriae] for the protection 
of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their 
rights in respect of their relations with the federal 
government. In that field it is the United States, and not the 
state, which represents them as parens patriae.’”) (quoting 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923)). 
 
b. Speculative Harm 
 
The proposed amended complaint also invoked 
injuries that are contingent on remote possibilities.  In 
subsections (f) through (h) of paragraph 40, MCA claimed 
that the Project (specifically, the Genesis and Schaeffer 
Roundabouts) will result in “additional stormwater runoff” 
that will necessitate the construction of “Stormwater Basins” 
on the MCA property, which, MCA contends, will result in 
“groundwater contamination on and off” MCA’s property if 
“inadequate[ly] designed.” (PAC, at ¶40(F)-(H).)  The Board 
made similar allegations in subsections (e) and (f) of 
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paragraph 41.   
 
The District Court found these “hypothetical” 
allegations to be insufficiently specific and “highly 
speculative.”  (A26.)  We agree.  While stormwater 
contamination would appear to fall within NEPA’s zone of 
interests, it is contingent upon the failure of the stormwater 
basin—a system, not yet even designed much less 
constructed, intended to prevent that very environmental 
consequence.  Accepting them as true and with all inferences 
drawn in Appellants’ favor, these allegations fail to show that 
the Project will create an increased risk of actual, threatened 
or imminent environmental harm, and on that basis will be 
disregarded.   
 
c. Remaining Allegations 
 
The remaining allegations were likewise deficient.  
MCA claimed in subsection (d) that the Project “will result in 
noise and exhaust fumes from vehicle queues directly in 
front” of its property, (PAC, at ¶40(D)), and the Board 
submitted in subsections (a) and (g) that the Project will 
increase “noise and pollution” and “the risk of potentially 
devastating cumulative environmental effects.”  (¶41(A), 
(G).)  Appellees argue, however, that these additional 
allegations were intended only to mask the actual, economic 
injury motivating this litigation.  The Federal Appellees 
maintain that MCA and the Board have “long opposed” this 
Project on the economic ground that “its traffic circles will 
[not] be able to handle the amount of traffic that they hope to 
attract to their planned shopping center,” not on account of 
any potential environmental impact.  (Federal Appellees Br. 
at 22.) 
 
The vast majority of NEPA authority makes clear that 
economic injury alone does not satisfy the statute’s zone of 
interests test.  See, e.g., Ashley Creek Phosphate Co, 420 F.3d 
at 940 (collecting cases and noting that the “zone of interests” 
protected by NEPA is “environmental” and that courts have 
thus “consistently held that purely economic interests do not 
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fall within NEPA’s zone of interests”); Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 417 F.3d 
1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that an “‘allegation of 
injury to monetary interest alone may not,’ of course, ‘bring a 
party within the zone of environmental interests as 
contemplated by NEPA for the purposes of standing’”) 
(quoting Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 477, 452 
(D.C. Cir. 1977)); Central S.D. Coop. Grazing Dist. v. Sec. of 
the United States Dep’t of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 895 (8th Cir. 
2001) (holding that “[e]conomic interests alone” are “clearly 
not within the zone of interests to be protected by” NEPA).  
And while litigants need not be “pure of heart” in their 
motivation to sue, NEPA “cannot be used as a handy stick by 
a party with no interest in protecting against an environmental 
injury to attack a defendant.”  Town of Stratford v. F.A.A., 
285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  To be among those that 
Congress intended to bring suit under NEPA, a plaintiff’s 
actual interests must substantially align with the protection of 
our physical environment.  
 
Recognizing the force of this law, MCA and the Board 
belatedly argued that the Project may result in “fumes,” 
“pollution,” and “noise,” while making no effort to hide their 
obvious and strong interest in the success of MCA’s proposed 
shopping center.  In connection with a resolution passed in 
opposition to the Project, the Board advised PADOT that the 
planned construction will “severely impede commercial 
development of the Route 222 Corridor in the Township” and 
“deprive the Township of the needed revenues, employment 
and provision of goods associated with commercial 
development.”  (PAC, at ¶72(A).)  Similarly, MCA alleged 
that it “repeatedly advised PADOT” that the Project “will 
prevent MCA from constructing the Proposed Shopping 
Center, which development is an integral part of the 
Township’s planned growth and creation of employment and 
tax revenues.”  (PAC, at ¶72(B).)  Together, they maintained 
that, “[i]f the Proposed Shopping Center and other anticipated 
commercial development along the Route 222 Corridor is 
unable to occur because of the Project, the Project will have a 
significant detrimental impact upon economic activity and the 
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creation of jobs within the Township and the region.”  (PAC, 
at ¶73(B).)   
 
In reviewing the District Court’s decision to deny the 
motion to amend the complaint, we accept as true all 
allegations contained therein.  But in doing so, we also 
acknowledge the real interest that MCA and the Board have 
in developing the region purportedly affected by this highway 
construction.  While MCA and the Board now allege that the 
Project may result in certain “environmental effects,” the 
proposed amended complaint makes clear that such harms are 
only fortuitously aligned with their stated interests.  This 
places them outside the statute’s zone of interests for good 
reason.  To accept NEPA litigants whose interests 
accidentally overlap with the statute’s intended purpose 
would not only create a class of plaintiffs far larger than 
Congress originally intended, it also would serve to distort the 
effect of NEPA itself.  See Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“[J]udicial intervention may defeat statutory goals if it 
proceeds at the behest of interests that coincide only 
accidentally with those goals.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The motion to amend the complaint was properly 
denied as futile.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
the motion to dismiss the complaint and denying the motion 
to amend.   
 
